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31 août 2006

Arno m'a tuer

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Arnaud devient le porte-parole de Ségolène. Lorsque j'ai appris la nouvelle, je pensais que c'était une blague, puis de l'intox. Mais non, l'information est sérieuse. J'ai ensuite eu envie de vomir, de crier mon incompréhension, de pleurer.

Après Frangy et la prise en compte de la nullité de la pimprenelle du Poitou, après Fouras et l'arène de la médiocrité pour se justifier, Arnaud s'enfonce maintenant dans son positionnement.

Etre porte-parole n'est pas rien: il "porte" la "parole" de la favorite des sondages, rien de moins. Finies ses envolées lyriques de gauche, il devra défendre les positions droitères de Ségolène, point barre ! Que fera-t-il si elle recommence à clamer son admiration pour la politique de Tony Blair ? Il devra défendre ses choix, rien de plus. Arnaud a pour moi renoncé à ses convictions, à son intégrité, à sa liberté de parole.

En outre, j'ai l'impression que notre tribun nous prend pour des cons: à Fouras, il avait été décidé que les militants de notre courant voteraient pour se prononcer sur le soutien d'Arnaud, de notre courant à Ségolène Royal. Arnaud est passé outre: que fera-t-il si sa base le désavoue ? Il démissionne de son courant ? A-t-il songé à cette possibilité ou bien le texte de clôture du rassemblement d'été n'était-il qu'un mensonge pour faire bonne figure devant la presse ? Arnaud tient-il encore à son courant, à ceux qui l'ont soutenu après Le Mans, ou bien ne roule-t-il désormais que pour lui, que pour son avenir personnel et sa volonté de ministère ?

Je n'ai même plus envie de parler de stratègie, alors qu'il me semble tellement évident que Ségolène ne sera pas candidate à l'investiture, le duel se faisant uniquement entre Fabius et Hollande. Je veux juste hurler que Arnaud nous a trahi ! Arnaud s'assoit sur ses principes, sur ses idées. Il n'est plus le leader de notre courant, il ne parle plus en notre nom, il est devenu comme tous les autres: un politicard assumé, un éléphanteau aux longues canines, un homme du parti prêt à se vendre au plus offrant, quel qu'en soit le prix, même si il doit le payer au prix fort, se renier !

Arnaud nous a quitté. Paix à son âme.

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27 août 2006

Fouras explosé

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Trois jours à Fouras pour l'assemblée d'été de Rénover Maintenant. Plutôt pathétiques (j'annonce la couleur). A se demander ce que je fais dans ce courant. Voici la chronologie des évènements.

Départ mercredi matin à l'aube. Départ en voiture avec P. qui conduisait et que je remercie, accompagné de F. et de J., deux camarades parisiens. Arrivés vers 10h, je pars visiter la ville pendant que les éminents membres du CA se réunissent. Au programme, évidemment l'alliance (ou le ralliement) d'Arnaud à Ségolène.

Vers 14h, je retrouve mes camarades de chambrée: ma soeur A. et JF, accompagnés de M. également militante du 18è. Nous nous rendons à l'Assemblée Générale: environ 600 personnes y participent. Après le vote du budget, les prises de position s'enchainent sur le positionnement de RM pour les présidentielles. Ma position n'a guère évoluée: j'ai toujours pensé qu'il fallait être stratège, bien évidemment, mais qu'il fallait également respecter le vote des militants. Je condamne donc le manque démocratique du ralliement, Arnaud ayant engagé ses troupes (notamment via un papier de Thierry Mandon dans Libé) vers le soutien à Ségolène, sans avoir consulté sa base. Quand on s'érige comme le défenseur de la démocratie et du renouveau des pratiques militantes, je trouve ce choix encore plus agaçant et condamnable. Encore une fois la forme est importante. Sur le fond, je n'ai jamais apprécié Ségolène Royal, et ne souhaite pas, à titre personnel, soutenir sa candidature. Celà ne fait pas de moi un fervent partisant de Laurent Fabius. Je me retrouve donc totalement dans le choix de Mickaël Moglia, secrétaire général de RM, pour lequel le choix le plus sage "consisterait à laisser les militants choisir individuellement celui ou celle qui sera le (la) mieux à même de défendre les couleurs du PS lors des futures élections présidentielles. Cette troisième option m’apparaît comme étant la plus acceptable pour tous, celle qui préserve le plus notre avenir commun au sein de RM.".

Les prises de parole tournent donc autour de ce thème. Toutes ne volent pas très haut. Entre un membre de la direction nationale arrivant avec ses lunettes de soleil devant les yeux, "ébloui par Ségolène Royal". Entre un élu pro-Ségolène accusant les contestaires de faire le jeu de la droite. Autant dire que le débat ne décolle pas, que les arguments sont assez minables. Heureusement les prises de position de Mickaël, de Thierry et d'Arnaud relèveront un peu le niveau du débat. Et l'on se quitte avec un arrière-goût amer de gâchis.

La soirée se terminera par un diner avec les militants parisiens. Puis une virée dans les bars de Fouras, pour oublier. Coucher tard. Lever laborieux. Lecture de la presse. Libé pas très tendre avec la direction. Je file à un atelier sur la politique culturelle: malheureusement les intervenants semblent mal choisi au vu du sujet des débats: des représentants des intermittents. Pas très productif. Je zappe le débat avec Cassen.

Petit détour vers la plage avec A. et JF pour décompresser. Puis le diner dans la salle de sport. Une longue attente, un diner médiocre, une musique atroce, une résonnance à donner la migraine. Heureusement quelques discussions fort intéressantes. Puis, nouvelle tournée des bars.

Le lendemain matin, le discours d'Arnaud est attendu par toute la salle. Mon avis est mitigé. La partie sur l'écologie et l'environnement est assez grandiose, l'orateur excellent et l'on sent les convictions sincères. Un grand moment de tribune ! Puis Arnaud nous parle du texte obtenu à l'issu de cette assemblée de notre courant. La pomme a été coupé en deux. Arnaud pas très à l'aise. Il a du mal à nous convaincre. Les convictions de notre leader sur ce sujet semble moins rigoureuses.

Voici donc le passage du texte, celui censé rassembler tout le monde, afin d'éviter que notre courant n'explose: "La démarche engagée à Frangy par Arnaud Montebourg en direction de la candidature de Ségolène Royal sera poursuivie. Après le dépôt des candidatures, cette proposition d’orientation sera présentée et soumise au vote des assemblées générales départementales qui se prononceront avant le vote des militants du parti socialiste.". On obtient le vote, ce qui n'est pas si mal. Seulement, si Ségolène n'est pas candidate, cet alliance aura été un coup d'épée dans l'eau ...

Me concernant, j'aurais aimé que nous faisions deux votes. Le premier consistait à savoir si notre courant devait soutenir un candidat (pour moi en effet, ce choix n'était pas nécessaire). Et si le courant souhaitait soutenir un candidat, que nous votions ensuite sur le candidat.

Je pars donc de Fouras déçu: en apparence, l'unité du courant est préservé, mais les tensions restent plus que palpables. Pour la première fois Arnaud n'a pas réussi à entrainer l'ensemble des militants derrière lui. Ces trois jours n'auront abouti qu'à un sursis de deux mois. Des camps se sont formés, des divergences ont apparues, les contestataires ont été malmenés, les pressions ont envenimé les évènements. Tout celà à cause de Ségolène, quelle tristesse ...

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26 août 2006

Le clip du vendredi (III)

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Avec une heure de retard, le clip du vendredi ...
Cette semaine, un live de Katie Melua. J'ai choisi Spider's Web le single le plus connu, mais ce moment d'émotion me tire les larmes aux yeux, ce soir tout particulièrement.

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23 août 2006

Rentrée politique

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Je pars ce mercredi à l'aube pour Fouras, assister à l'Université d'été de Rénover Maintenant. Je serai ensuite (si tout se passe bien) à celle du PS à La Rochelle.
J'essaierai de me connecter de là-bas pour vous faire part de mes impressions. Les débats risquent d'être âpres, les tensions évidentes : les dés sont lancés ...

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21 août 2006

Discours d'Arnaud

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Voici le discours d'Arnaud Montebourg à la Fête de la Rose de Frangy.



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Frangy en Berne

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Hier, ma première fois à Frangy. La fête de la Rose. Je suis rentré très énervé et j'ai pas arrêté de parler pendant une heure et demie avec L. tellement j'étais furibond de ce que j'ai vu.

Une fois passé le trajet au départ de Paris, le déjeuner saucisses-lentilles, les serrages de louches, les discussions plus ou moins intéressantes, je préfère vous parler de ce que j'ai ressenti.

Ségolène Royal ne sera jamais présidente de la République. Elle est juste très mauvaise. Mauvaise en communication, pas charismatique, trop froide et antipathique, pas rigoureuse, mal entourée. Petit inventaire :

Ségolène arrive, provoquant la bousculade que l'on sait. Elle se dirige vers la table VIP (oui, oui, ça existe !) pour serrer deux-trois mains. Première erreur : elle est l'invitée d'honneur de la Fête de la Rose. Elle se devait de faire le tout des tables, d'aller au contact des militants rassemblés en partie pour elle. Au lieu de ça, elle les méprise en ne les cotoyant pas.

Ensuite, Ségolène ne mange pas avec nous (
juste méprisant) et se retire très rapidement dans sa "loge" pour potasser son discours. Pas très peuple la dame aux caméras ...

Arrive le moment des discours. Deux à trois mille personnes sur la pelouse du stade de Frangy. Les deux "stars" arrivent, escortés par des gendarmes. Une arrivée à l'américaine pour Arnaud, serrant des mains, faisant des saluts amicaux. Une arrivée en princesse pour Ségolène, faisant des petits signes de la main (comme la reine d'Angleterre avec ses ouailles). Je ne la sens pas très à l'aise dans son tailleur très BCBG, les talons dans la boue bourguignonne. Souriante à son habitude - comme si des fils tiraient sa bouche vers le haut - mais pas chaleureuse.

Après les présentations, Arnaud Montebourg prend le micro pour faire son discours. Discours manuscrit, raturé, personnel. Arnaud chaud (quelques verres de vin en trop), bon orateur, enthousiaste, rassembleur. Il prend les journalistes à partie pour leur annoncer la menace pesant sur leur indépendance si Sarkozy devait prendre le pouvoir. Petit bémol : il enterre la 6è République pour défendre la "Nouvelle République". Les compromis ont commencé.

Puis Ségolène se rend à la tribune. Elle lira son discours de plus d'une heure. Discours dactylographié, long et fade. Je ne reviendrai pas sur le contenu, tellement analysé. Ou alors juste pour constater qu'elle reprend également l'expression de "Nouvelle République". Voix monocorde sans entrain. Aucun charisme. Pas de présence. On voit même des participants partir du stade. Je parle avec un militant du coin, très déçu par la prestation. Je me réfugie au stand des gaufres avec B. (mon chauffeur ;-)) qui m'annonce à l'avance ce qui va être repris par les medias : l'héritage Mitterrandien, les "si je suis en situation". Une heure de discours pour ça ...

Je vais revenir sur le discours. J'ai réussi -
grâce à B. - à me le procurer. 23 pages en gros caractères. Une rhétorique de techno sans goût. Le pire : page 9, une série de huit questions, à laquelle elle répond : "C'est la droite". Genre : "Qui accepte que la liberté s'arrête là où commence le Code du Travail ? C'est la droite". Autant dire qu'un brillant orateur aurait enflammé la foule, les faisant répèter en criant avec elle : "C'est la droite". Malheureusement, Ségolène était seule pour les première question, accompagnée de 20 personnes au maximum sur les dernières. Un bide.

Je suis éberlué en parcourant la page 17. Lisez donc cet extrait : "[...], après que nous aillons laisser [...]". Je veux bien croire que les conseillers de Ségolène soient pressés, mais jusqu'à faire des fautes de français aussi ridicules, je suis éberlué ! Et elle l'a laissée passer. A sa place (de Ségolène), autant dire que le rédacteur de ce discours se verrait obligé de corriger sa copie, avant qu'elle ne soit distribuée à la presse, dans le meilleur des cas, se retrouverait à la porte pour oser communiquer un discours avec des fautes, dans le pire.

Passons à la comm' pure. Je ne sais pas qui conseille la primprenelle du Poitou, mais Raffarin n'a rien à lui envier. A mois que ce ne soit Jacques Pilhan, mort. Sur le look. Sur le discours. Un peu de training pour les discours lui ferait également du bien. Lui apprendre à apprivoiser la foule, à la canaliser, à la séduire. A élever la voix pour ne pas endormir son auditoire. Prévoir une distribution (ou au pire une vente) de roses pour les participants (ça passe mieux à l'image, ça fait plus de gauche). Prévoir un petit panneau avec une baseline purement destinée aux caméras en-dessous le pupitre, afin de marteler l'élément fort de son intervention. Faire des bises, serrer des mains. Aimer les gens.

Ecrire de vrais discours. Apprendre à s'exprimer en public. Avoir une présence, une prestance en tribune, dans la foule. Il manque tout pour que Ségolène soit présidente un jour.

Alors, me direz-vous, nous n'avons pas eu cette impression en regardant la TV, en lisant la presse. LCI parlait de "triomphe", BFM encensait le discours (ils n'ont pas du voir les fautes), Le Monde se complait à rapporter la bousculade, France Info ne retenait que ce dont B. me parlait. Alors, sans tomber dans la théorie du complot, je pense que les médias nous mentent volontairement, à moins que les journalistes soient vraiment tous si mauvais. Ségolène Royal n'est qu'un phénomène médiatique. Les lecteurs, téléspectateurs, auditeurs ne se rendent pas compte quel point Ségolène manque de charisme et d'envergure. Alors je m'interroge. Ségolène apparaît pour moi comme le pire des candidats à l'investiture du PS. C'est dire. Qui aurait intérêt à la propulser en haut des sondages ? Et si Sarkozy se réjouissait de se retrouver face à elle au second tour, étant persuadé que ses failles seraient alors révélées au grand jour ? Ou sinon de la bousculer en face-à-face de second tour ...

Alors, je ne voterai pas Ségolène, c'est décidé. A moins qu'elle ne potasse ses dossiers, qu'elle lise des tonnes de notes sur tous les sujets qu'elle ne maitrise nullement. Qu'elle change, véritablement. J'en doute.

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18 août 2006

Le clip du vendredi (II)

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Pour le second clip, Joe le Taxi, par Vanessa Paradis. Le morceau qui va lancer sa carrière. Toute mon enfance : 1988, j'avais 5 ans, elle en avait 14. Chanson écrite par Etienne Roda-Gil. Deux ans plus tard, elle tourne dans Noce Blanche, de Jean-Claude Brisseau, film dans lequel elle tombe amoureuse de son professeur, Bruno Cremer. L'année suivante, elle rencontre Serge Gainsbourg qui compose son prochain album.



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16 août 2006

Soie

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On m'a prêté un livre : Soie d'Alessandro Baricco. J'avais adoré Sans sang du même auteur. Mais là, je viens de finir le roman, et je n'en suis pas encore sorti. Je suis encore émerveillé par la beauté de ce texte. Ce chef d'oeuvre est comme son titre : sensuel, doux, léger. L'histoire d'un négociant en oeufs de vers à soie. Un livre de voyages entre le sud de la France et le Japon. Un livre d'amours. Un auteur brillant utilisant un style d'écriture sublime. De la poèsie romancée. Juste grandiose.

Alors courrez acheter ce joyau : il est en vente pour moins de 5€ sur le site de la FNAC. Et plutôt que de continuer de mal en parler, je préfère en retranscrire un passage.

Bonne lecture.

La France, les voyages en mer, le parfum des mûriers dans Lavilledieu, les trains à vapeur, la voix d'Hélène. Hervé Joncour continua à raconter sa vie comme jamais, de sa vie, il ne l'avait racontée. La jeune fille continuait de la fixer, avec une violence qui arrachait à chacune de ses paroles l'obligation de sonner comme mémorable. La pièce semblait désormais avoir glissé dans une immobilité sans retour, quand, tout à coup, et de façon absolument silencieuse, la jeune fille glissa une main hors de son vêtement, et la fit avancer sur la natte, devant elle. Hervé Joncour vit arriver cette tache claire en marge de son champ de vision, il la vit effleurer la tasse de thé d'Hara Kei puis, absurdement, continuer sa progression pour aller s'amparer sans hésitation de l'autre tasse, celle dans laquelle il avait bu, la soulever avec légèreté et l'emporter. Hara Kei n'avait pas un seul instant cessé de fixer, sans expression aucune, les lèvres d'Hervé Joncour.
La jeune fille souleva légèrement la tête.
Pour la première fois, elle détacha son regard d'Hervé Joncou, et le posa sur la tasse.
Lentement, elle la tourna jusqu'à avoir sous ses lèvres l'endroit exact où il avait bu.

En fermant à demi les yeux, elle but une gorgée de thé.

Elle écarta la tasse de ses lèvres.

La replaça doucement là où elle l'avait prise.

Fit disparaître sa main sous son vêtement.
Reposa sa tête sur les genoux d'Hara Kei.

Les yeux ouverts, fixés dans ceux d'Hervé Joncour.

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15 août 2006

Le plan israëlo-américain d'invasion du Liban

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Ci-dessous un article passionnant tiré du New Yorker. Cet article est long et en anglais. Pour résumé Seymour Hersh (le journaliste d'investigation qui fut le premier à dénoncer la responsabilité de Donald Rumsfeld dans la politique de torture à Abou Ghraib) affirme que le gouvernement américain avait programmé, avec le gouvernement israëlien l'invasion du Liban, bien avant que le soldat kidnappé par le Hezbollah - prétexte à l'invasion - ne se fasse enlever. Ainsi au printemps, des émissaires de Bush et de Olmert se sont rencontrés afin d'établir des soutiens lors des attaques.

Washington’s interests in Israel’s war.
by SEYMOUR M. HERSH

In the days after Hezbollah crossed from Lebanon into Israel, on July 12th, to kidnap two soldiers, triggering an Israeli air attack on Lebanon and a full-scale war, the Bush Administration seemed strangely passive. “It’s a moment of clarification,” President George W. Bush said at the G-8 summit, in St. Petersburg, on July 16th. “It’s now become clear why we don’t have peace in the Middle East.” He described the relationship between Hezbollah and its supporters in Iran and Syria as one of the “root causes of instability,” and subsequently said that it was up to those countries to end the crisis. Two days later, despite calls from several governments for the United States to take the lead in negotiations to end the fighting, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said that a ceasefire should be put off until “the conditions are conducive.”

The Bush Administration, however, was closely involved in the planning of Israel’s retaliatory attacks. President Bush and Vice-President Dick Cheney were convinced, current and former intelligence and diplomatic officials told me, that a successful Israeli Air Force bombing campaign against Hezbollah’s heavily fortified underground-missile and command-and-control complexes in Lebanon could ease Israel’s security concerns and also serve as a prelude to a potential American preëmptive attack to destroy Iran’s nuclear installations, some of which are also buried deep underground.

Israeli military and intelligence experts I spoke to emphasized that the country’s immediate security issues were reason enough to confront Hezbollah, regardless of what the Bush Administration wanted. Shabtai Shavit, a national-security adviser to the Knesset who headed the Mossad, Israel’s foreign-intelligence service, from 1989 to 1996, told me, “We do what we think is best for us, and if it happens to meet America’s requirements, that’s just part of a relationship between two friends. Hezbollah is armed to the teeth and trained in the most advanced technology of guerrilla warfare. It was just a matter of time. We had to address it.”

Hezbollah is seen by Israelis as a profound threat—a terrorist organization, operating on their border, with a military arsenal that, with help from Iran and Syria, has grown stronger since the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon ended, in 2000. Hezbollah’s leader, Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, has said he does not believe that Israel is a “legal state.” Israeli intelligence estimated at the outset of the air war that Hezbollah had roughly five hundred medium-range Fajr-3 and Fajr-5 rockets and a few dozen long-range Zelzal rockets; the Zelzals, with a range of about two hundred kilometres, could reach Tel Aviv. (One rocket hit Haifa the day after the kidnappings.) It also has more than twelve thousand shorter-range rockets. Since the conflict began, more than three thousand of these have been fired at Israel.

According to a Middle East expert with knowledge of the current thinking of both the Israeli and the U.S. governments, Israel had devised a plan for attacking Hezbollah—and shared it with Bush Administration officials—well before the July 12th kidnappings. “It’s not that the Israelis had a trap that Hezbollah walked into,” he said, “but there was a strong feeling in the White House that sooner or later the Israelis were going to do it.”

The Middle East expert said that the Administration had several reasons for supporting the Israeli bombing campaign. Within the State Department, it was seen as a way to strengthen the Lebanese government so that it could assert its authority over the south of the country, much of which is controlled by Hezbollah. He went on, “The White House was more focussed on stripping Hezbollah of its missiles, because, if there was to be a military option against Iran’s nuclear facilities, it had to get rid of the weapons that Hezbollah could use in a potential retaliation at Israel. Bush wanted both. Bush was going after Iran, as part of the Axis of Evil, and its nuclear sites, and he was interested in going after Hezbollah as part of his interest in democratization, with Lebanon as one of the crown jewels of Middle East democracy.”

Administration officials denied that they knew of Israel’s plan for the air war. The White House did not respond to a detailed list of questions. In response to a separate request, a National Security Council spokesman said, “Prior to Hezbollah’s attack on Israel, the Israeli government gave no official in Washington any reason to believe that Israel was planning to attack. Even after the July 12th attack, we did not know what the Israeli plans were.” A Pentagon spokesman said, “The United States government remains committed to a diplomatic solution to the problem of Iran’s clandestine nuclear weapons program,” and denied the story, as did a State Department spokesman.

The United States and Israel have shared intelligence and enjoyed close military coöperation for decades, but early this spring, according to a former senior intelligence official, high-level planners from the U.S. Air Force—under pressure from the White House to develop a war plan for a decisive strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities—began consulting with their counterparts in the Israeli Air Force.

“The big question for our Air Force was how to hit a series of hard targets in Iran successfully,” the former senior intelligence official said. “Who is the closest ally of the U.S. Air Force in its planning? It’s not Congo—it’s Israel. Everybody knows that Iranian engineers have been advising Hezbollah on tunnels and underground gun emplacements. And so the Air Force went to the Israelis with some new tactics and said to them, ‘Let’s concentrate on the bombing and share what we have on Iran and what you have on Lebanon.’ ” The discussions reached the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, he said.

“The Israelis told us it would be a cheap war with many benefits,” a U.S. government consultant with close ties to Israel said. “Why oppose it? We’ll be able to hunt down and bomb missiles, tunnels, and bunkers from the air. It would be a demo for Iran.”

A Pentagon consultant said that the Bush White House “has been agitating for some time to find a reason for a preëmptive blow against Hezbollah.” He added, “It was our intent to have Hezbollah diminished, and now we have someone else doing it.” (As this article went to press, the United Nations Security Council passed a ceasefire resolution, although it was unclear if it would change the situation on the ground.)

According to Richard Armitage, who served as Deputy Secretary of State in Bush’s first term—and who, in 2002, said that Hezbollah “may be the A team of terrorists”—Israel’s campaign in Lebanon, which has faced unexpected difficulties and widespread criticism, may, in the end, serve as a warning to the White House about Iran. “If the most dominant military force in the region—the Israel Defense Forces—can’t pacify a country like Lebanon, with a population of four million, you should think carefully about taking that template to Iran, with strategic depth and a population of seventy million,” Armitage said. “The only thing that the bombing has achieved so far is to unite the population against the Israelis.”

Several current and former officials involved in the Middle East told me that Israel viewed the soldiers’ kidnapping as the opportune moment to begin its planned military campaign against Hezbollah. “Hezbollah, like clockwork, was instigating something small every month or two,” the U.S. government consultant with ties to Israel said. Two weeks earlier, in late June, members of Hamas, the Palestinian group, had tunnelled under the barrier separating southern Gaza from Israel and captured an Israeli soldier. Hamas also had lobbed a series of rockets at Israeli towns near the border with Gaza. In response, Israel had initiated an extensive bombing campaign and reoccupied parts of Gaza.

The Pentagon consultant noted that there had also been cross-border incidents involving Israel and Hezbollah, in both directions, for some time. “They’ve been sniping at each other,” he said. “Either side could have pointed to some incident and said ‘We have to go to war with these guys’—because they were already at war.”

David Siegel, the spokesman at the Israeli Embassy in Washington, said that the Israeli Air Force had not been seeking a reason to attack Hezbollah. “We did not plan the campaign. That decision was forced on us.” There were ongoing alerts that Hezbollah “was pressing to go on the attack,” Siegel said. “Hezbollah attacks every two or three months,” but the kidnapping of the soldiers raised the stakes.

In interviews, several Israeli academics, journalists, and retired military and intelligence officers all made one point: they believed that the Israeli leadership, and not Washington, had decided that it would go to war with Hezbollah. Opinion polls showed that a broad spectrum of Israelis supported that choice. “The neocons in Washington may be happy, but Israel did not need to be pushed, because Israel has been wanting to get rid of Hezbollah,” Yossi Melman, a journalist for the newspaper Ha’aretz, who has written several books about the Israeli intelligence community, said. “By provoking Israel, Hezbollah provided that opportunity.”

“We were facing a dilemma,” an Israeli official said. Prime Minister Ehud Olmert “had to decide whether to go for a local response, which we always do, or for a comprehensive response—to really take on Hezbollah once and for all.” Olmert made his decision, the official said, only after a series of Israeli rescue efforts failed.

The U.S. government consultant with close ties to Israel told me, however, that, from Israel’s perspective, the decision to take strong action had become inevitable weeks earlier, after the Israeli Army’s signals intelligence group, known as Unit 8200, picked up bellicose intercepts in late spring and early summer, involving Hamas, Hezbollah, and Khaled Meshal, the Hamas leader now living in Damascus.

One intercept was of a meeting in late May of the Hamas political and military leadership, with Meshal participating by telephone. “Hamas believed the call from Damascus was scrambled, but Israel had broken the code,” the consultant said. For almost a year before its victory in the Palestinian elections in January, Hamas had curtailed its terrorist activities. In the late May intercepted conversation, the consultant told me, the Hamas leadership said that “they got no benefit from it, and were losing standing among the Palestinian population.” The conclusion, he said, was “ ‘Let’s go back into the terror business and then try and wrestle concessions from the Israeli government.’ ” The consultant told me that the U.S. and Israel agreed that if the Hamas leadership did so, and if Nasrallah backed them up, there should be “a full-scale response.” In the next several weeks, when Hamas began digging the tunnel into Israel, the consultant said, Unit 8200 “picked up signals intelligence involving Hamas, Syria, and Hezbollah, saying, in essence, that they wanted Hezbollah to ‘warm up’ the north.” In one intercept, the consultant said, Nasrallah referred to Olmert and Defense Minister Amir Peretz “as seeming to be weak,” in comparison with the former Prime Ministers Ariel Sharon and Ehud Barak, who had extensive military experience, and said “he thought Israel would respond in a small-scale, local way, as they had in the past.”

Earlier this summer, before the Hezbollah kidnappings, the U.S. government consultant said, several Israeli officials visited Washington, separately, “to get a green light for the bombing operation and to find out how much the United States would bear.” The consultant added, “Israel began with Cheney. It wanted to be sure that it had his support and the support of his office and the Middle East desk of the National Security Council.” After that, “persuading Bush was never a problem, and Condi Rice was on board,” the consultant said.

The initial plan, as outlined by the Israelis, called for a major bombing campaign in response to the next Hezbollah provocation, according to the Middle East expert with knowledge of U.S. and Israeli thinking. Israel believed that, by targeting Lebanon’s infrastructure, including highways, fuel depots, and even the civilian runways at the main Beirut airport, it could persuade Lebanon’s large Christian and Sunni populations to turn against Hezbollah, according to the former senior intelligence official. The airport, highways, and bridges, among other things, have been hit in the bombing campaign. The Israeli Air Force had flown almost nine thousand missions as of last week. (David Siegel, the Israeli spokesman, said that Israel had targeted only sites connected to Hezbollah; the bombing of bridges and roads was meant to prevent the transport of weapons.)

The Israeli plan, according to the former senior intelligence official, was “the mirror image of what the United States has been planning for Iran.” (The initial U.S. Air Force proposals for an air attack to destroy Iran’s nuclear capacity, which included the option of intense bombing of civilian infrastructure targets inside Iran, have been resisted by the top leadership of the Army, the Navy, and the Marine Corps, according to current and former officials. They argue that the Air Force plan will not work and will inevitably lead, as in the Israeli war with Hezbollah, to the insertion of troops on the ground.)

Uzi Arad, who served for more than two decades in the Mossad, told me that to the best of his knowledge the contacts between the Israeli and U.S. governments were routine, and that, “in all my meetings and conversations with government officials, never once did I hear anyone refer to prior coördination with the United States.” He was troubled by one issue—the speed with which the Olmert government went to war. “For the life of me, I’ve never seen a decision to go to war taken so speedily,” he said. “We usually go through long analyses.”

The key military planner was Lieutenant General Dan Halutz, the I.D.F. chief of staff, who, during a career in the Israeli Air Force, worked on contingency planning for an air war with Iran. Olmert, a former mayor of Jerusalem, and Peretz, a former labor leader, could not match his experience and expertise.

In the early discussions with American officials, I was told by the Middle East expert and the government consultant, the Israelis repeatedly pointed to the war in Kosovo as an example of what Israel would try to achieve. The NATO forces commanded by U.S. Army General Wesley Clark methodically bombed and strafed not only military targets but tunnels, bridges, and roads, in Kosovo and elsewhere in Serbia, for seventy-eight days before forcing Serbian forces to withdraw from Kosovo. “Israel studied the Kosovo war as its role model,” the government consultant said. “The Israelis told Condi Rice, ‘You did it in about seventy days, but we need half of that—thirty-five days.’ ”

There are, of course, vast differences between Lebanon and Kosovo. Clark, who retired from the military in 2000 and unsuccessfully ran as a Democrat for the Presidency in 2004, took issue with the analogy: “If it’s true that the Israeli campaign is based on the American approach in Kosovo, then it missed the point. Ours was to use force to obtain a diplomatic objective—it was not about killing people.” Clark noted in a 2001 book, “Waging Modern War,” that it was the threat of a possible ground invasion as well as the bombing that forced the Serbs to end the war. He told me, “In my experience, air campaigns have to be backed, ultimately, by the will and capability to finish the job on the ground.”

Kosovo has been cited publicly by Israeli officials and journalists since the war began. On August 6th, Prime Minister Olmert, responding to European condemnation of the deaths of Lebanese civilians, said, “Where do they get the right to preach to Israel? European countries attacked Kosovo and killed ten thousand civilians. Ten thousand! And none of these countries had to suffer before that from a single rocket. I’m not saying it was wrong to intervene in Kosovo. But please: don’t preach to us about the treatment of civilians.” (Human Rights Watch estimated the number of civilians killed in the NATO bombing to be five hundred; the Yugoslav government put the number between twelve hundred and five thousand.)

Cheney’s office supported the Israeli plan, as did Elliott Abrams, a deputy national-security adviser, according to several former and current officials. (A spokesman for the N.S.C. denied that Abrams had done so.) They believed that Israel should move quickly in its air war against Hezbollah. A former intelligence officer said, “We told Israel, ‘Look, if you guys have to go, we’re behind you all the way. But we think it should be sooner rather than later—the longer you wait, the less time we have to evaluate and plan for Iran before Bush gets out of office.’ ”

Cheney’s point, the former senior intelligence official said, was “What if the Israelis execute their part of this first, and it’s really successful? It’d be great. We can learn what to do in Iran by watching what the Israelis do in Lebanon.”

The Pentagon consultant told me that intelligence about Hezbollah and Iran is being mishandled by the White House the same way intelligence had been when, in 2002 and early 2003, the Administration was making the case that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. “The big complaint now in the intelligence community is that all of the important stuff is being sent directly to the top—at the insistence of the White House—and not being analyzed at all, or scarcely,” he said. “It’s an awful policy and violates all of the N.S.A.’s strictures, and if you complain about it you’re out,” he said. “Cheney had a strong hand in this.”

The long-term Administration goal was to help set up a Sunni Arab coalition—including countries like Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt—that would join the United States and Europe to pressure the ruling Shiite mullahs in Iran. “But the thought behind that plan was that Israel would defeat Hezbollah, not lose to it,” the consultant with close ties to Israel said. Some officials in Cheney’s office and at the N.S.C. had become convinced, on the basis of private talks, that those nations would moderate their public criticism of Israel and blame Hezbollah for creating the crisis that led to war. Although they did so at first, they shifted their position in the wake of public protests in their countries about the Israeli bombing. The White House was clearly disappointed when, late last month, Prince Saud al-Faisal, the Saudi foreign minister, came to Washington and, at a meeting with Bush, called for the President to intervene immediately to end the war. The Washington Post reported that Washington had hoped to enlist moderate Arab states “in an effort to pressure Syria and Iran to rein in Hezbollah, but the Saudi move . . . seemed to cloud that initiative.”

The surprising strength of Hezbollah’s resistance, and its continuing ability to fire rockets into northern Israel in the face of the constant Israeli bombing, the Middle East expert told me, “is a massive setback for those in the White House who want to use force in Iran. And those who argue that the bombing will create internal dissent and revolt in Iran are also set back.”

Nonetheless, some officers serving with the Joint Chiefs of Staff remain deeply concerned that the Administration will have a far more positive assessment of the air campaign than they should, the former senior intelligence official said. “There is no way that Rumsfeld and Cheney will draw the right conclusion about this,” he said. “When the smoke clears, they’ll say it was a success, and they’ll draw reinforcement for their plan to attack Iran.”

In the White House, especially in the Vice-President’s office, many officials believe that the military campaign against Hezbollah is working and should be carried forward. At the same time, the government consultant said, some policymakers in the Administration have concluded that the cost of the bombing to Lebanese society is too high. “They are telling Israel that it’s time to wind down the attacks on infrastructure.”

Similar divisions are emerging in Israel. David Siegel, the Israeli spokesman, said that his country’s leadership believed, as of early August, that the air war had been successful, and had destroyed more than seventy per cent of Hezbollah’s medium- and long-range-missile launching capacity. “The problem is short-range missiles, without launchers, that can be shot from civilian areas and homes,” Siegel told me. “The only way to resolve this is ground operations—which is why Israel would be forced to expand ground operations if the latest round of diplomacy doesn’t work.” Last week, however, there was evidence that the Israeli government was troubled by the progress of the war. In an unusual move, Major General Moshe Kaplinsky, Halutz’s deputy, was put in charge of the operation, supplanting Major General Udi Adam. The worry in Israel is that Nasrallah might escalate the crisis by firing missiles at Tel Aviv. “There is a big debate over how much damage Israel should inflict to prevent it,” the consultant said. “If Nasrallah hits Tel Aviv, what should Israel do? Its goal is to deter more attacks by telling Nasrallah that it will destroy his country if he doesn’t stop, and to remind the Arab world that Israel can set it back twenty years. We’re no longer playing by the same rules.”

A European intelligence officer told me, “The Israelis have been caught in a psychological trap. In earlier years, they had the belief that they could solve their problems with toughness. But now, with Islamic martyrdom, things have changed, and they need different answers. How do you scare people who love martyrdom?” The problem with trying to eliminate Hezbollah, the intelligence officer said, is the group’s ties to the Shiite population in southern Lebanon, the Bekaa Valley, and Beirut’s southern suburbs, where it operates schools, hospitals, a radio station, and various charities.

A high-level American military planner told me, “We have a lot of vulnerability in the region, and we’ve talked about some of the effects of an Iranian or Hezbollah attack on the Saudi regime and on the oil infrastructure.” There is special concern inside the Pentagon, he added, about the oil-producing nations north of the Strait of Hormuz. “We have to anticipate the unintended consequences,” he told me. “Will we be able to absorb a barrel of oil at one hundred dollars? There is this almost comical thinking that you can do it all from the air, even when you’re up against an irregular enemy with a dug-in capability. You’re not going to be successful unless you have a ground presence, but the political leadership never considers the worst case. These guys only want to hear the best case.”

There is evidence that the Iranians were expecting the war against Hezbollah. Vali Nasr, an expert on Shiite Muslims and Iran, who is a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and also teaches at the Naval Postgraduate School, in Monterey, California, said, “Every negative American move against Hezbollah was seen by Iran as part of a larger campaign against it. And Iran began to prepare for the showdown by supplying more sophisticated weapons to Hezbollah—anti-ship and anti-tank missiles—and training its fighters in their use. And now Hezbollah is testing Iran’s new weapons. Iran sees the Bush Administration as trying to marginalize its regional role, so it fomented trouble.”

Nasr, an Iranian-American who recently published a study of the Sunni-Shiite divide, entitled “The Shia Revival,” also said that the Iranian leadership believes that Washington’s ultimate political goal is to get some international force to act as a buffer—to physically separate Syria and Lebanon in an effort to isolate and disarm Hezbollah, whose main supply route is through Syria. “Military action cannot bring about the desired political result,” Nasr said. The popularity of Iran’s President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a virulent critic of Israel, is greatest in his own country. If the U.S. were to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities, Nasr said, “you may end up turning Ahmadinejad into another Nasrallah—the rock star of the Arab street.”

Donald Rumsfeld, who is one of the Bush Administration’s most outspoken, and powerful, officials, has said very little publicly about the crisis in Lebanon. His relative quiet, compared to his aggressive visibility in the run-up to the Iraq war, has prompted a debate in Washington about where he stands on the issue.

Some current and former intelligence officials who were interviewed for this article believe that Rumsfeld disagrees with Bush and Cheney about the American role in the war between Israel and Hezbollah. The U.S. government consultant with close ties to Israel said that “there was a feeling that Rumsfeld was jaded in his approach to the Israeli war.” He added, “Air power and the use of a few Special Forces had worked in Afghanistan, and he tried to do it again in Iraq. It was the same idea, but it didn’t work. He thought that Hezbollah was too dug in and the Israeli attack plan would not work, and the last thing he wanted was another war on his shift that would put the American forces in Iraq in greater jeopardy.”

A Western diplomat said that he understood that Rumsfeld did not know all the intricacies of the war plan. “He is angry and worried about his troops” in Iraq, the diplomat said. Rumsfeld served in the White House during the last year of the war in Vietnam, from which American troops withdrew in 1975, “and he did not want to see something like this having an impact in Iraq.” Rumsfeld’s concern, the diplomat added, was that an expansion of the war into Iran could put the American troops in Iraq at greater risk of attacks by pro-Iranian Shiite militias.

At a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on August 3rd, Rumsfeld was less than enthusiastic about the war’s implications for the American troops in Iraq. Asked whether the Administration was mindful of the war’s impact on Iraq, he testified that, in his meetings with Bush and Condoleezza Rice, “there is a sensitivity to the desire to not have our country or our interests or our forces put at greater risk as a result of what’s taking place between Israel and Hezbollah. . . . There are a variety of risks that we face in that region, and it’s a difficult and delicate situation.”

The Pentagon consultant dismissed talk of a split at the top of the Administration, however, and said simply, “Rummy is on the team. He’d love to see Hezbollah degraded, but he also is a voice for less bombing and more innovative Israeli ground operations.” The former senior intelligence official similarly depicted Rumsfeld as being “delighted that Israel is our stalking horse.”

There are also questions about the status of Condoleezza Rice. Her initial support for the Israeli air war against Hezbollah has reportedly been tempered by dismay at the effects of the attacks on Lebanon. The Pentagon consultant said that in early August she began privately “agitating” inside the Administration for permission to begin direct diplomatic talks with Syria—so far, without much success. Last week, the Times reported that Rice had directed an Embassy official in Damascus to meet with the Syrian foreign minister, though the meeting apparently yielded no results. The Times also reported that Rice viewed herself as “trying to be not only a peacemaker abroad but also a mediator among contending parties” within the Administration. The article pointed to a divide between career diplomats in the State Department and “conservatives in the government,” including Cheney and Abrams, “who were pushing for strong American support for Israel.”

The Western diplomat told me his embassy believes that Abrams has emerged as a key policymaker on Iran, and on the current Hezbollah-Israeli crisis, and that Rice’s role has been relatively diminished. Rice did not want to make her most recent diplomatic trip to the Middle East, the diplomat said. “She only wanted to go if she thought there was a real chance to get a ceasefire.”

Bush’s strongest supporter in Europe continues to be British Prime Minister Tony Blair, but many in Blair’s own Foreign Office, as a former diplomat said, believe that he has “gone out on a particular limb on this”—especially by accepting Bush’s refusal to seek an immediate and total ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah. “Blair stands alone on this,” the former diplomat said. “He knows he’s a lame duck who’s on the way out, but he buys it”—the Bush policy. “He drinks the White House Kool-Aid as much as anybody in Washington.” The crisis will really start at the end of August, the diplomat added, “when the Iranians”—under a United Nations deadline to stop uranium enrichment—“will say no.”

Even those who continue to support Israel’s war against Hezbollah agree that it is failing to achieve one of its main goals—to rally the Lebanese against Hezbollah. “Strategic bombing has been a failed military concept for ninety years, and yet air forces all over the world keep on doing it,” John Arquilla, a defense analyst at the Naval Postgraduate School, told me. Arquilla has been campaigning for more than a decade, with growing success, to change the way America fights terrorism. “The warfare of today is not mass on mass,” he said. “You have to hunt like a network to defeat a network. Israel focussed on bombing against Hezbollah, and, when that did not work, it became more aggressive on the ground. The definition of insanity is continuing to do the same thing and expecting a different result.”

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Un soir d'orage

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13 août 2006

Paris Dernière censuré ...

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Eh oui, encore une vidéo (promis, je vais me remettre à écrire!).

Ci-dessous la vidéo d'un Paris Première censuré : dans la cultissime émission de Frédéric Taddeï sur Paris Première, la première dame se fait interviewer par le célèbre présentateur noctambule dans une boite de nuit lesbienne de la capitale !


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11 août 2006

Le clip du vendredi (I)

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Désormais, chaque vendredi, je vous fait partager un clip, une musique que j'aime particulièrement.
Aujourd'hui : Lettre à France de Michel Polnareff (1977).



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08 août 2006

Liban: Cessez le feu immédiat et inconditionnel !

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Grand rassemblement pacifique à Paris
Mardi 08 Août 2006, 19h, Place de La Bastille

En trois semaines, le bilan de la guerre infligée par Israël au Liban est terrifiant : plus de 900 morts civils parmi eux 1/3 d’enfants, plus de 3 000 blessés, 1 million de personnes déplacées sans ressources, soit ¼ de la population libanaise …
… Et pourtant cette situation injustifiable et intolérable peine encore à s’établir aux yeux de tous.
Face à cette situation absurde où tout un pays se fait ravager, tous les Libanais réclament inlassablement d’une seule voix : L’ARRET IMMEDIAT DE L’AGRESSION ISRAELIENNE
Parce qu’il est de leur devoir de relayer le cri d’alarme de leurs compatriotes, les représentants des partis politiques libanais en France, les représentants d’associations non gouvernementales et le « Collectif de citoyens Libanais et amis du Liban » lancent un appel commun pour un grand rassemblement pacifique ce Mardi 8 août, Place de la Bastille, à 19h, afin de :
* Soutenir l’Etat Libanais qui réclame l’arrêt immédiat de l’agression avant toute négociation
* Exprimer une solidarité sans faille avec le peuple libanais
* Condamner les crimes de guerre commis par Israël et demander des dommages et intérêts
* Dénoncer l’administration américaine qui soutient la machine de guerre israélienne
* Insister sur une couverture médiatique internationale plus responsable capable ainsi de pallier le vide politique et diplomatique

Pour signer la pétition : cliquer ici
Pétition d'artistes : ici
Pour plus d'infos : ici

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03 août 2006

Le mariage blanc ?

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Ségolène et Arnaud se sont fiancés. Le mariage risque d'être prononcé lors de la Fête de la Rose, à Frangy ce 20 Août. Pour les militants de Rénover Maintenant, la nouvelle fut un peu rude à encaisser.

Pourtant Arnaud avait deux autres possibilités : soit s'allier avec Fabius, soit maintenir sa candidature. La première option eut probablement satisfait celles et ceux voyant en Fafounet le défenseur des idées de gauche. Naïfs sont-ils de confondre l'ancien premier-ministre avec le facteur de la LCR. Du haut de son logement de la place du Panthéon, j'ai toujours eu du mal à croire en la sincèrité de Fabius quant à son virage à babord toute !

La seconde option l'obligait à aller à la pêche aux soutiens, ou à obliger le Parti à modifier les statuts, afin qu'il obtienne les 30 signatures. Je pressens que Arnaud ne devait pas véritablement souhaiter cette investiture, et ne se sentait probablement pas prêt à affronter le carnage carnassier entre éléphants qui se trame à la rentrée.

En terme de comm', son choix est malin : il a l'ensemble des projecteurs braqués sur lui, au moins jusqu'à la fin du mois. D'abord Frangy, avec la venue de la dame au caméra en guest, puis Fouras où il devra affronter l'hébètement de ses militants voués à la rénovation du PS.

Quant à sa stratègie, malheureusement je ne pense que ce soit la meilleure, étant persuadé que Ségolène n'arrivera pas à gagner la présidentielle de 2007. Je persiste à croire que le retour de Jospin est imminent, que le cas échéant Hollande serait le candidat unitaire. Si je me trompais, je n'imagine guère Marie-Ségolène battre Sarcoco au second tour, en admettant que Bayrou (ou Le Pen, mais je parie plus sur le leader centriste, créant une surprise) ne vienne pas chambouler le scrutin.

Bref, je suis décontenancé. Je continue mon militantisme au sein de ce courant, attendant de connaitre les propositions de la pimprenelle du Poitou quant à la rénovation des institutions, quant à son programme économique de relance du pays, quant à sa conception de la mondialisation, etc.

Bref, je ne suis pas heureux de ce choix, mais je le respecte. J'espère juste que Arnaud a bien négocié son ralliement, et que, en cas de victoire de la gauche, il bénéficiera d'un joli poste. Si jamais tu me lis, Arnaud, prends le ministère de l'Agriculture !

En attendant bon courage pour la cohabitation avec Julien Dray, je pense que ce ne sera pas une mince affaire ...

Alea jacta est !

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02 août 2006

De retour

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Mais ou étais-je ?
Ben, chez moi ! Quelle question ...

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